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Testing Ambient Pollution Instruments with Heterogeneous Agents
Abstract
This paper investigates the ability of ambient pollution instruments to induce a group
of heterogeneous agents to choose a target outcome. Six controlled laboratory sessions were
conducted with heterogeneous agents facing ambient pollution instruments with lump sum or
proportional ﬁnes and bonuses. Sessions are compared with a study of these exogenous targeting
instruments and homogenous agents using complete information and certainty [25]. The data
show that contracts can indeed be developed that induce heterogeneous groups to choose the
target outcome; however, substantial ineﬃciency and inequality were observed.
Keywords: Nonpoint Source Pollution, Moral Hazard in Groups, Group Decision Making,
Experiments
Proposed Running Heading: Testing Ambient Pollution Instruments.
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1. Introduction
The theoretical literature on nonpoint source pollution suggests that ambient pollution instru-
ments can be developed to induce polluters to comply with a standard [10, 22, 31, 32]. However,
authors such as Shortle and Horan [23], and Weersink, et al. [28] temper this result citing the
diﬃculty of monitoring ambient conditions, political limitations, and suggesting that ambient
instruments are only appropriate for simple situations where the number of polluters is small
and homogenous. Our paper supports this pessimistic position using empirical evidence from
a series of laboratory experiments. The results suggest that ambient pollution instruments can
be designed to induce the socially optimal outcome at the aggregate level. However, there are
signiﬁcant inequities in the outcomes of ﬁrms with diﬀerent emissions capacities, which results in
ineﬃciency. This inequality is not apparent in the theoretical studies as individuals are assumed
to choose the payoﬀ maximizing decision. However, in the experimental environment presented
here, subjects with lower unconstrained emission levels (small capacity polluters) reduce their
emissions by less than the optimal amount while subjects with higher unconstrained emissions
(large capacity polluters) reduce their emissions by more than the optimal amount. This results
in the large capacity polluters shouldering more of the burden of pollution reduction and earning
lower payoﬀs than the small capacity polluters.
More speciﬁcally, this paper describes an experiment which is based on the model of nonpoint
source pollution problem used by authors such as Segerson [22], Xepapadeas [31], [32], and
Horan, et al. [10]. The primary treatment variable is whether or not the group is composed of
subjects who have identical unconstrained emission levels (homogeneous sessions) or whether
half of the subjects are small capacity polluters and half are large capacity polluters (hetero-
geneous sessions).1 Subjects are fully informed of the payoﬀ schedules of all of the members in
their group. Subjects choose a decision number which is analogous to a level of emission. They
know the private payoﬀ—the cost of reducing their emissions from the unconstrained level—
of choosing this action. They are then informed of the aggregate level of emission and the
1 The homogeneous sessions are discussed more fully in Spraggon [25].
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resulting charge as determined by the ambient pollution instrument.2 Two ambient pollution
instruments are tested. The ﬁrst is the Tax/Subsidy contract suggested by Segerson [22] which
induces agents to select values closest to the target level in a previous study with homogeneous
payoﬀ functions [25]. This contract involves a proportional bonus if the total of group emissions
is below the target and a proportional ﬁne if this group total exceeds the target. As discussed
in Spraggon [25], the distinguishing feature of this contract is that it results in the desired
individual target being a dominant strategy. The second contract is the Group Fine contract
which is similar to the instrument suggested by Holmstrom [11] for the worker eﬀort problem.
The Group Fine contract involves a lump sum ﬁne if the total of group emissions is above the
target. This contract generates multiple Nash equilibria. Each group of subjects participates in
twenty-ﬁve repetitions of both contracts. As a result of this within subject design the eﬀects of
switching between these types of contracts can be tested.
Moral hazard in groups is a common social dilemma which is applicable to not only the
problem of nonpoint source pollution but to problems such as worker eﬀort, common property
resources and the provision of public goods. Most of the applicable empirical work has been
conducted for the provision of public goods (although, Nalbantian and Schotter [16] provide
some evidence against instruments like the Group Fine for the worker eﬀort problem). There are
a number of important diﬀerences between the standard public good environment and the exper-
iment reported here. Primarily the nonpoint source pollution problem is typically thought of as
a public bad. Authors who examine the diﬀerences between experiments framed as public goods
and those framed as public bad [2, 19, 24, 30], suggest subjects choose the dominant strategy
more often when the experiment is framed as a public bad. The Tax/Subsidy instrument is most
similar to a non-linear public bad with an internal optimum. However, subjects are not presented
with a target in non-linear public bad experiments as they are in this environment. Holt and
Laury [12] provide a survey of the results from non-linear public good experiments. They show
that decisions are generally more consistent when the dominant strategy is in the interior of the
decision space than when it is at a corner or when there are multiple Nash equilibria. However,
2 We are interested in the incentives provided by the ambient pollution instruments and as a result subjects
are not informed that their decisions will be interpreted as the choice of a level of pollution to emit.
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none of the studies surveyed involve agents with heterogeneous payoﬀ functions. The Group
Fine is most similar to a non-linear threshold public bad with an interior solution. There are
many empirical studies of the threshold public good environment, surveyed by Ledyard [14],
and Cadsby and Maynes [5] and the threshold common property resource problem by Rapoport
and Suleiman [20]. These studies show that if the value of the public good is high enough
relative to the required level of individual contribution the public good will be consistently
provided [5]. The added complication of heterogeneity in public good environments in general
and threshold public good environments speciﬁcally, results in the public good being provided
less often [7, 8, 12, 14, 21, 29]. Taking the previous results for public bads and heterogeneity
together suggests that subjects should be more likely to choose the Nash equilibrium decision
which may lead to more compliance with the standard in the environment investigated in this
paper.3
This study shows that ambient pollution instruments that induce the target decision as
a dominant strategy are an eﬀective solution to the problem of group moral hazard with
heterogeneous agents. However, there are signiﬁcant reductions in eﬃciency when the group
is composed of subjects who have diﬀerent unconstrained emission levels. Further, the eﬀects of
switching between the contracts are signiﬁcant. As in the homogeneous study [25], individual
decisions are not adequately described by the Nash equilibrium. Small capacity subjects choose
decision numbers which are signiﬁcantly higher than the Nash prediction and large capacity
subjects choose decision numbers which are signiﬁcantly below the Nash prediction. Thus, this
study suggests that the Tax/Subsidy instrument induces the larger capacity subjects to shoulder
a greater share of the reduction to the target level than the small capacity subjects. As a result
if equity among heterogeneous polluters is an important consideration this study suggests that
ambient instruments are not an appropriate regulation device. Thus as Shortle and Horan [23]
3 The purpose of this paper is not to test the two instruments against each other. Since the Tax/Subsidy
instrument results in a unique Nash equilibrium and the Group Fine instrument results in multiple Nash equilibria
previous studies of public goods with interior solutions suggest that the Tax/Subsidy instrument will induce more
compliance [12]. Instead, both instruments are being tested for the eﬀects of heterogeneity in the individual payoﬀ
functions against the case where individuals have homogeneous payoﬀ functions.
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suggest these instruments may not be appropriate when the ﬁrms responsible for the emissions
are heterogeneous.
2. Experimental Design
The experiment examines the moral hazard in groups problem in the context of nonpoint
source pollution and compares groups of polluters who are homogeneous with those who are
heterogeneous in terms of uncontrolled emissions [22, 31].4 Heterogeneity is introduced to model
the situation where ﬁrms have diﬀerent uncontrolled emission levels. Six subjects participated
in each session. Half of these subjects took the role of small capacity polluters and the other
half took the role of large capacity polluters. In each period the subjects were asked to choose
a number. It was explained that their choice resulted in a private payoﬀ and a group payoﬀ.
The private payoﬀ was directly related to the decision number, which could be found in a table
provided to each subject. The group payoﬀ depended on the subject’s own decision as well as
the choices of the other subjects and the contract being tested. For consistency with previous
studies, subjects had full information as to their payoﬀ structure and the payoﬀ structure of the
other participants in their group. Each group participated in both contracts in two twenty-ﬁve
period phases. The data from these sessions are compared with sessions where all subjects took
the role of medium capacity polluters. The sessions where subjects all had the same capacity
are referred to as homogeneous and the sessions where subjects had diﬀerent capacities are
referred to as heterogeneous.5
4 As noted previously, the homogeneous sessions were conducted earlier and are discussed extensively in
Spraggon (2002) [25]
5 The sessions were identical except for the diﬀerences in capacity of the subjects and four contracts were
tested in the homogeneous sessions [25]. The instructions for this experiment are available upon request from the
author or from his website at: http://ﬂash.lakeheadu.ca/˜jspragg/.
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In the experiment individuals choose their decision numbers without being observed analo-
gous to nonpoint source polluters whose emissions are unobservable.6 The higher the individual’s
emission level, the higher the private payoﬀ due to the lower cost of emission abatement. As
with the homogeneous case, I identify the eﬃcient choice of individual decision numbers by
assuming that society is represented by a social planner who maximizes the beneﬁts from




Bn(xn) − D(X) (1)
where n indexes subjects n = 1,...,6, xn is the emission level chosen by subject n, and X is
the observed total of these emission levels. Aggregate emissions are directly related to ambient
level of pollution for a noncumulative (or “ﬂow”) pollutant. For simplicity I assume that the





Heterogeneity is introduced through the individuals’ beneﬁt functions. Individuals represent
either small capacity or large capacity ﬁrms. Subjects of the small type had an unconstrained
emission capacity of 75 units (represented by a maximum decision number of 75) and those of
the large type had an unconstrained emission capacity of 125. Subjects from the homogeneous
study will be referred to as medium capacity ﬁrms as they had a capacity of 100 units. The
beneﬁt function for an individual depended on her emission level (xn) and her unconstrained
emission level (xmax
n ):
Bn(xn) = 25 − 0.002(xmax
n − xn)2. (3)









6 In the paper I will refer to the decisions made by subjects as emission levels for consistency. However,
as discussed in the introduction, subjects where told that they were choosing decision numbers and that the
aggregate decision number was the group total.
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with respect to xn where xmax
n = 125 for n = 1,2,3 and xmax
n = 75 for n = 4,5,6. The socially
optimal emission level for each individual is found by solving:
∂SP/∂xn = 0.004(xmax
n − xn) − 0.3 = 0 ⇒ x∗
n = xmax
n − 75. (5)
Therefore the socially optimal emission level for small types (xmax
n = 75) is 0, for medium types
(xmax
n = 100) is 25, and for the large types (xmax
n = 125) is 50.7 Thus, the socially optimal
aggregate emission level is equal to 150 units (as it was for the homogeneous sessions).
3. Contracts
The nonpoint source pollution problem arises because the ﬁrm’s choice of emission level is
unobservable. As a result, the externality they impose cannot be corrected by taxes or subsidies
based on individual emissions. The ability of two contracts, referred to as Tax/Subsidy and
Group Fine, to mitigate this problem is evaluated herein. These contracts are of the same form





tn(X − X∗) + τn if X > X∗
sn(X − X∗) − βn if X ≤ X∗.
(6)
Where sn and tn are a subsidy and a tax respectively, βn is a bonus and τn is a ﬁne. These
parameters could diﬀer by agent but this has not been done for this study. The target X∗ is
exogenous in this model and represents the level of pollution which the social regulator chooses
to allow. For the purposes of the experiment X∗ is the socially optimal aggregate emission level
from the social planner’s problem given by equation (4). The Tax/Subsidy contract has sn =
tn = 0.3, and βn = τn = 0, and the Group Fine contract has τn = 24, and sn = tn = βn = 0.
These parameters are chosen so that the instruments induce the socially optimal outcome as a
7 This environment diﬀers from the public good environment where subjects contribute tokens. In this envi-
ronment subjects are asked to choose a decision number rather than to make a contribution. As a result it seems
less likely that subjects will feel that choosing zero is equivalent to not participating as they may in a public
goods environment.
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Nash equilibrium. The Tax/Subsidy contract results in the socially optimal emission level being
a dominant strategy, while the Group Fine contract results in multiple Nash equilibria under
the assumption of risk neutrality (see Spraggon [25] for details). Xepapades [31] shows that the
Tax/Subsidy contract is also an eﬃcient solution to the nonpoint source pollution problem in
an inﬁnite-horizon dynamic model.8
4. Payoﬀ Maximization
An individual’s payoﬀ function is the beneﬁt function (3) minus the value of the contract (6),
πn = Bn(xn) − Tn(X). Thus, the expected payoﬀ function for the Tax/Subsidy contract is
πn = 25.00 − 0.002(xmax
n − xn)2 − 0.3(X − 150). (7)
Notice that the socially optimal solution is the unique Nash equilibrium because the ﬁrst order
condition for the subject’s payoﬀ function is identical to the ﬁrst order condition for the social
planner’s problem.9 Since this is a dominant strategy, it is also the Nash equilibrium for the
repeated game by backwards induction (Osborne and Rubinstien 1994 pp. 157-158) [17].
An individual’s expected payoﬀ function under the Group Fine contract depends on the
probability that the sum of the emission levels is less than the target level Prob(X < 150) or
Prob(X−n ≤ 150 − xn) where X−n is the sum of all individuals’ emission levels except subject
n ( X−n =
P
j6=n xj). Then Tn(X) for the Group Fine contract is Tn(X) = 24(1−Prob(X−n ≤
150 − xn)) for agent n. Thus, for a large capacity subject the expected proﬁt function under
the Group Fine contract is
πn = 25 − 0.002(xmax
n − xn)2 − 24[1 − Prob(X−n ≤ 150 − xn)]. (8)
Clearly it is in an agent’s best interest to choose xn so that X = 150 or, if the ﬁne cannot
be avoided, to choose xn equal to its maximum value. As a result there are two types of
8 Xepapadeas’ [31] dynamic version of the contract includes the ﬁrm’s discount rate, the rate of pollution decay
and possibly a term which depends on the other ﬁrms’ adjustments depending on the information structure.
9 ∂πn/∂xn = 0.004(x
max
n − xn) − 0.3 which is identical to the ﬁrst order condition of the social planner’s
problem (5).
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Nash equilibrium. These equilibria can be described as socially optimal when the group total is
equal to 150 and individually optimal when each subject chooses their maximum emission level.
Multiple equilibria in the one-shot game suggests that there may be repeated game eﬀects in the
experiment. The Group Fine contract, however, is discussed for comparison with the threshold
public good literature [5, 14, 20] and the analysis of the repeated game eﬀects are beyond the
scope of this paper.
Subjects may use simple heuristics to determine how to choose their emission level, as
suggested by Rapoport and Suleiman [21] and Hackett, Schlager and Walker [9]. Such heuristics
might be based on notions of equity. Subjects could choose to select emission levels which are
equal, an equal proportion of their unconstrained emission level, an equal reduction from their
unconstrained emission level or an equal proportional reduction from their maximum. In this
study these heuristics lead to diﬀerent results, whereas for the homogeneous study all of the
subjects had the same payoﬀ function and as a result they all lead to the optimal outcome. For
equal absolute emission levels, the six subjects in this study, with a target of 150, would each
choose xn = 25. If the subjects reach the target of 150 by either reducing their unconstrained
number by the same proportion or by selecting a number which is the same proportion of their
maximum, large capacity and small capacity subjects will choose 31 and 19 respectively.10 The
optimal outcome (large capacity subjects choose 50, and small capacity subjects choose 0) is
an equal absolute reduction. These predictions as well as the predictions of Nash equilibria are
summarized in Table I.
5. Results
The results from the sessions with heterogeneity in the payoﬀ functions are based on data
collected from thirty-six subjects who were recruited from the student population at McMaster
10 Let p be the proportion that subjects reduce their emissions by, or the proportion of their emissions which
they choose. For the decision to be a Nash equilibrium, the group total must be 150. Therefore 150 = 3(75)p +
3(125)p which implies that p = 1/4.
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Table I. Theoretical Predictions
Contract Subject Capacity Nash Equilibrium Simple Heuristics
Optimal Sub-Optimal Abs. Dec. Prop. Dec. Abs. Red.
Large 50 None 25 31 50
Tax/Subsidy Medium 25 None 25 25 25
Small 0 None 25 19 0
Large Multiple 125 25 31 50
Group Fine Medium Multiple 100 25 25 25
Small Multiple 75 25 19 0
Notes: Sub-Optimal refers to the solution where all subjects choose their maximum decision number,
Abs. Dec. refers to subjects choosing equity in the absolute decision number, Prop. Dec. refers to
subject choosing equity in the proportion of their maximum, and Abs. Red. refers to subjects choosing
equity in the absolute reduction from their maximum decision number
University. Six sessions were conducted in which subjects participated in twenty-ﬁve periods
of either the Tax/Subsidy or Group Fine contract and then twenty-ﬁve periods where subjects
participated under the other contract. Groups participating in the ﬁrst twenty-ﬁve periods
are referred to as inexperienced, while those participating in the second twenty-ﬁve periods
are referred to as experienced. Bankruptcies11 were handled by excusing the subject from the
phase of the experiment in which the bankruptcy occurred. On average subjects earned twenty-
ﬁve dollars Canadian for sessions that lasted about an hour and a half. These sessions are
compared with data from six sessions which were conducted in an identical manner except that
the subjects all had homogeneous payoﬀ functions.
Each group of six subjects participated in one session which consisted of twenty-ﬁve peri-
ods with both of the contracts. Only the ﬁrst phase of each session provides an independent
11 It was possible for subjects to earn negative payoﬀs in each period. Each subject was given an initial
endowment of ﬁve dollars Canadian and if their cumulative payoﬀ fell below zero in any period, they were
removed from the rest of that phase of the experiment. Everyone in the group was informed that there had been
a bankruptcy and that the group total was now the sum of the remaining subjects’ emission levels. Bankruptcies
occurred in three sessions which were used in the data analysis. All of these sessions involved experienced subjects
and the eﬀects of the bankruptcies will be discussed in the analysis presented below.
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observation. Regression analysis bases the standard errors on the variance in the data from the
whole experiment. It therefore exploits the factorial design to provide more powerful tests
to determine whether the mean emission level totals and mean emission levels by subject
capacity are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Since the sessions with experienced
and inexperienced subjects are not independent, tests are initially calculated separately for
these groups.
The experiment has been repeated for twenty-ﬁve periods for consistency with previous
experimental studies [14, 16]. Typically this is done to allow for learning. However, in the
nonpoint source pollution context if these instruments were implemented in a ﬁeld setting it
would presumably involve a number of ﬁrms choosing their emission levels for a period of time,
then being ﬁned or rewarded depending on the ambient level of pollution and then choosing
their emission levels again. I argue that it is the mean outcomes over the twenty-ﬁve periods
that are of interest to us. This provides some indication of the average level of compliance over
the period where individuals are learning and once they understand the environment.12
The eﬃciency of the instrument in this environment can be thought of in terms of the value
of the Social Planner’s problem. The closer the value of (4) to the optimal value (where all of
the ﬁrms emit the optimal level of pollution) the more eﬃcient the instrument. As a result,
eﬃciency in this environment is deﬁned as  =
SPACTUAL−SPSTATUSQUO
SPOPTIMAL−SPSTATUSQUO where SPACTUAL is
the value of the social planner’s problem (4) for the actual decision number chosen by the
agents, SPSTATUSQUO is the value of the social planner’s problem when the agents choose their
unconstrained emission levels and SPOPTIMAL is the value of the social planner’s problem when
the agents choose the optimal emission levels. Eﬃciency is interesting because it not only takes
into account whether or not the target is achieved but also the cost at which the target is
achieved. For example, the least eﬃcient case for the target to be achieved is for all of the large
type subjects and one of the small type reduce their decision numbers to zero, and the other
two small type subjects choose their unconstrained levels of emission (75). The aggregate level
of emission would be 150 but the eﬃciency is only 44.4 percent.
12 Subjects were surveyed as to how long it took them before they felt that they understood the experiment
and the typical response was ﬁve periods.
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To summarize, the data shows that the Tax/Subsidy instrument is able to induce both
homogeneous and heterogeneous groups to choose the target outcome at the aggregate level.
Moreover, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the homogeneous and heterogeneous groups
at the aggregate level. Experience does not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on these observations. How-
ever, there seem to be systematic diﬀerences between sessions with experience and without.
Tax/Subsidy sessions which follow Group-Fine sessions tend to have higher aggregate emission
levels than the Tax/Subsidy sessions run without experience. Similarly, Group Fine sessions
which follow Tax/Subsidy sessions tend to have lower aggregate emission levels than the Group
Fine sessions run without experience. The ﬁrst two results concern inexperienced subjects,
while the third result concerns experienced subjects. Result four compares the outcomes at the
individual level.
Result 1: Under the Tax/Subsidy instrument there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between groups of inexperienced subjects with homogeneous and heterogeneous
payoﬀ functions at the aggregate level.
Notice in Table II that under Tax/Subsidy the mean group emission levels are not signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from 150 for both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. Table III presents
the analysis of variance for the entire sample controlling for treatment (Tax/Subsidy versus
Group Fine), whether or not subjects had heterogeneous payoﬀ functions, whether or not they
had experience and the interaction between these three variables.13 Notice that only the p-values
for the Model, Group Fine and the interaction between Group Fine and Experience are below
0.10. Mean eﬃciency (Table II ) for the homogeneous treatment is higher than the eﬃciency for
the heterogeneous treatment. Figure 1 (the mean group totals for the Tax/Subsidy instrument
with inexperienced subjects by period) shows that part of the explanation for this diﬀerence is
that the aggregate emission level for heterogeneous groups is higher than for the homogeneous
groups in many periods. The other part of the explanation is due to the individual level decision
making and will be discussed in the ﬁnal result.
13 Analysis of Variance conducted only for the inexperienced subjects provides the same results.
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Table II. Mean Group Emission Levels and Mean Group Eﬃciencies by Treatment for Inexperienced
Subjects.
Treatment Mean Group Conﬁdence Interval Mean Group
Emission Lower Bound Upper Bound Eﬃciency
Tax/Subsidy, Homogeneous, 158.44 125.3 191.58 96.3
Inexperienced Subjects (7.702) (1.09)
[3] [3]
Tax/Subsidy, Heterogeneous, 170.47 141.99 198.95 85.1
Inexperienced Subjects (6.62) (4.88)
[3] [3]
Group Fine, Homogeneous, 358 -96.9 812.9 53.5
Inexperienced Subjects (105.73) (22.46)
[3] [3]
Group Fine, Heterogeneous, 509.47 447.2 571.73 22.2
Inexperienced Subjects (14.47) (3.63)
[3] [3]
Standard errors are provided in parenthesis and number of observations are provided in square brackets.
Table III. Anova on Group Total, by Session, Full Sample
Number of Observations: 24 Root MSE: 105.02
R-squared: 0.6335 Adj R-squared: 0.4732
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 305029.92 7 43575.71 3.95 0.0108
Group Fine 186025 1 186025 16.87 0.0008
Homogeneity 14737.16 1 14737.16 1.34 0.2647
Experience 29979.63 1 29979.63 2.72 0.1187
Interactions
Group Fine*Homogeneity 12450.64 1 12450.64 1.13 0.3038
Group Fine*Experience 52117.44 1 52117.44 4.73 0.0451
Homogeneity*Experience 6215.89 1 6215.89 0.56 0.4637
Group Fine*Homogeneity*Experience 3504.17 1 3504.17 0.32 0.5808
Residual 176467.26 16 11029.2
Total 481497.19 23 20934.66
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Result 2: The Group Fine instrument is consistent with previous studies for both
groups of inexperienced subjects with homogeneous and heterogeneous payoﬀ func-
tions at the aggregate level.
Table II shows that the aggregate emission levels for the Group Fine instrument with both
Homogeneous and Heterogeneous inexperienced groups are well above the target and highly
variable. Table II also shows that the eﬃciencies are very low. Figure 2 conﬁrms this, showing
that the aggregate emission levels are well above the target in all periods and indeed for the
heterogeneous groups seem to be converging towards the maximum aggregate emission level of
600. This is consistent with previous studies of threshold public goods [5] which suggest that
groups will converge to zero contributions if the reward is not high enough. This suggests that
a higher penalty in this environment may have resulted in more eﬃcient results. However, such
a large ﬁne may not be politically feasible as if even one participant deviates slightly from the
optimal decision a huge penalty is imposed on all of the participants including those who are
reducing their emissions to the optimal level.
Result 3: The eﬀect of experience in the environment is insigniﬁcant; however,
there are signiﬁcant eﬀects of switching between the instruments.
Table IV shows that the group totals are again closer to the target level and the eﬃciencies
are higher for the Tax/Subsidy than for the Group Fine instrument with experienced subjects.14
Notice in Figures 3 and 4 that the results are very similar for homogeneous and heterogeneous
agents across each instrument. There is one notable diﬀerence between the inexperienced and
experienced subjects: For the Tax/Subsidy instrument the mean group total for heterogeneous
experienced groups is less than that for homogenous groups where it was higher for inexperi-
enced subjects. However, notice that eﬃciency is higher for the homogeneous rather than the
heterogeneous groups. The Anova for all of the treatment variables on group total (Table III)
14 Since some of the sessions with experienced subjects were aﬀected by bankruptcies the mean group decision
numbers may be lower for these sessions as the maximum possible aggregate emission level falls from 600 to
500. Each of the treatments with experienced subjects except for the Group Fine with heterogeneous agents
experienced bankruptcies in one of the three sessions.
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Table IV. Mean Group Emission Levels and Mean Group Eﬃciencies by Treatment for Experienced Subjects.
Treatment Mean Group Conﬁdence Interval Mean Group
Emission Lower Bound Upper Bound Eﬃciency
Tax/Subsidy, Homogeneous, 188.87
∗ 171.78 206.17 89.1
Experienced Subjects (4.00) (5.40)
[3] [3]
Tax/Subsidy, Heterogeneous, 184.96
∗ 152.63 217.29 76.3
Experienced Subjects (7.51) (6.89)
[3] [3]
Group Fine, Homogeneous, 250.47
∗ -191.11 692.04 74.82
Experienced Subjects (102.63) (21.67)
[3] [3]
Group Fine, Heterogeneous, 289.23 -78.77 657.22 63.94
Experienced Subjects (85.53) (17.78)
[3] [3]
Standard errors are provided in parenthesis and number of observations are provided in square brackets.
suggests that instrument and instrument interacted with experience are the only treatment
variables which have signiﬁcant eﬀects (at both the 5% and 10% levels).
That the Group Fine and experience interaction term in the full sample Anova (Table III)
is signiﬁcant suggests that subjects’ experience with one instrument aﬀected their decisions
under the other. The eﬀect can also be clearly seen in the eﬃciencies when the aggregate data
are plotted (Figure 5). This suggests that there are systematic diﬀerences in behavior between
groups who have experience with the Group Fine instrument before they are exposed to the
Tax/Subsidy instrument. Indeed it seems that the experienced groups under the Tax/Subsidy
instrument are more likely to choose higher emission levels after participating in the Group Fine
instrument and experienced groups under the Group Fine instrument choose lower decisions
after participating in Tax/Subsidy. This resulted in bankruptcies being observed under the
Tax/Subsidy contract with experienced subjects where no bankruptcies were observed with
inexperienced subjects.
The eﬀect of experience also shows up in the individual decisions (Table V). Large capacity
subjects chose on average higher numbers under the Tax/Subsidy instrument and lower numbers
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Table V. Conﬁdence Intervals for Mean Individual Emission Levels by Treatment.
Treatment Mean Individual Conﬁdence Interval
Emission Lower Bound Upper Bound
Tax/Subsidy, Large Capacity, 35.29 19.16 51.43
Inexperienced Subjects (3.75)
[3]




Tax/Subsidy, Large Capacity, 41.58 -8.56 91.70
Experienced Subjects (11.65)
[3]
Tax/Subsidy, Small Capacity, 20.08 -27.85 68.00
Experienced Subjects (11.14)
[3]
∗ Indicates that the mean individual emission level is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
the Nash prediction. Standard errors are provided in parenthesis and number of
observations are provided in square brackets
under the Group Fine instrument with experience than they did without. Small capacity sub-
jects chose about the same level of emissions under the Tax/Subsidy instrument and lower under
the Group Fine with experience than they did without. This is consistent with the bankruptcies
which were observed under the Tax/Subsidy instrument when subjects were experienced (see
Table IV). The large capacity subjects choose larger numbers resulting in larger taxes to each
member of the group which results in subjects who are choosing lower numbers earning negative
payoﬀs in each period and eventually going bankrupt.
This eﬀect can also be observed in the distributions of individual decisions. Figures 6 and 7
depict these distributions for large capacity subjects for periods 11-20, and small capacity for
periods 11-20 respectively.15 Notice that under the Tax/Subsidy instrument for both the large
and small capacity subjects there are more decisions concentrated at the high and low limits
when subjects have experience, while for the Group Fine there are less decisions concentrated
15 The ﬁrst 10 periods and last four periods have been excluded to eliminate learning and end game eﬀects.
However, the graphs where all of the data is used are almost identical.
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at the end points when subjects have experience. This suggests that the outcome subjects
coordinate on under the ﬁrst contract aﬀects the outcome of the second contract. Comparing
Tables II and V shows this result clearly.
Result 4: Large capacity subjects reduce their emission levels by more than small
capacity subjects under the Tax/Subsidy contract.
Nash equilibrium does a good job in predicting the aggregate emission levels. Table V
shows that the mean decision number is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the Nash prediction only
for the small capacity subjects with no experience. Further, the data does not provide support
for any of the simple heuristic hypotheses. Recall that if a subject decides that all subjects
should choose an equal proportion of their unconstrained level (or an equal reduction from
their unconstrained level) small capacity subjects will choose 19 and large capacity subjects
will choose 31, and if they decide that all subjects should choose the same emission level they
will choose 25. However, there does not seem to be any signiﬁcant coordination on any of these
outcomes as shown in Figures 6 and 7. For both inexperienced and experienced small capacity
subjects the top left and right panels of ﬁgure 7 show that the dominant strategy (zero) is
played with the highest frequency. Moreover this strategy is played more frequently among the
experienced subjects. For the large capacity under the Tax/Subsidy the inexperienced subjects
choose numbers between twenty-ﬁve and forty-ﬁve. Whereas, with experience the distribution
of decisions for these subjects shows more decisions above forty-ﬁve but also a larger percentage
at zero. Thus, although Nash equilibrium does a good job of predicting average decisions, it does
not do a good job predicting individual decisions particularly for the large capacity subjects
under the Tax/Subsidy instrument.
Overall large capacity subjects are reducing their decision numbers by more than small
capacity subjects. This shows up in the ﬁnal payoﬀs. Table VI shows that small capacity
subjects earn much more than large capacity subjects under the Tax/Subsidy. Small capacity
subjects earn on average 6.63 Canadian dollars (C$) more than large capacity subjects for
inexperienced groups and C$ 6.14 more for experienced groups under the Tax/Subsidy contract.
Under the Group Fine small capacity subjects earn C$ 0.71 more for inexperienced groups and
C$ 4.12 more for experienced groups. Table VII presents the Anova for payoﬀ on all of the
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Table VI. Mean Payoﬀs for Heterogeneous Treat-
ments
Contract No Experience Experience
Large Small Large Small
7.28 13.91 4.55 10.69
Tax/Subsidy (3.26) (2.71) (5.29) (3.24)
[9] [9] [9] [9]
5.25 5.96 4.40 8.52
Group Fine (1.57) (0.71) (3.44) (4.03)
[9] [9] [9] [9]
Table VII. Anova on Payoﬀ, Full Sample by Individual
Number of Observations: 72 Root MSE: 3.31
R-squared: 0.5010 Adj R-squared: 0.4464
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 702.06 3 100.29 9.18 0.0000
Group Fine 170.06 1 170.06 15.56 0.0002
Large Capacity 348.17 1 348.17 31.87 0.0000
Experience 20.4 1 20.4 1.87 0.1766
Interactions
Group Fine*Large Cap. 70.69 1 70.69 6.47 0.0134
Group Fine*Experience 66 1 66 6.04 0.0167
Large Cap.*Experience 9.61 1 9.61 0.88 0.3519
Group Fine*Large Cap.*Experience 17.13 1 17.13 1.57 0.2151
Residual 699.27 64 10.93
Total 1401.33 71 19.74
treatment variables. Notice that the dummy variables for Group Fine, Large Capacity, and
the interactions for Group Fine and Large Capacity, and Group Fine and Experience are all
signiﬁcant. Using regression analysis (Table VIII), capacity, experience and the instrument
crossed with experience are signiﬁcant. This again illustrates the eﬀect of switching between
the instruments and the diﬀerences in payoﬀs between capacities are signiﬁcant.
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Table VIII. Regression on Payoﬀ by Individual, Full Sample
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error p-Value
Constant 10.69 1.10 0.000
Group Fine -2.17 1.56 0.169
Large Capacity -6.14 1.56 0.000
Experience 3.22 1.56 0.043
Group Fine*Large Capacity 2.01 2.20 0.364
Group Fine*Experience -5.78 2.20 0.011
Large Capacity*Experience -0.49 2.20 0.821
Group Fine*Large Capacity*Experience 3.90 3.12 0.215
Payoffs = β1 + β2groupfines + β3Homogeneitys + β4(groupfine ∗ Hom)s + β5(groupfine ∗ order)s
+β6(Hom ∗ order)s + β7(groupfine ∗ Hom ∗ order)s + s, where s indexes individual.
It seems as if the large capacity subjects are reducing their levels to oﬀset or avoid the ﬁnes
which must be paid due to the high emission levels chosen by the small capacity subjects. They
do this despite the fact that this results in lower payoﬀs themselves and higher payments for
those subjects who are choosing higher than Nash emission levels. By reducing their emission
levels below the Nash equilibrium level, the large capacity subjects oﬀset the ﬁnes paid by the
small capacity subjects, which reduces the incentive for the small capacity subjects to choose
the Nash emission levels. The debrieﬁng surveys which were conducted after each session, and
which asked the subjects to describe how they chose their emission levels, suggest that large
capacity subjects were behaving in their own self-interest rather than altruistically.
6. Conclusions
This study exacerbates the concern that many researchers (see Shortle and Horan [23]) have
regarding the ability of ambient pollution instruments to eﬀectively control the nonpoint source
pollution problem through the use of a series of controlled laboratory experiments. We point
out a number of areas of concern for the implementation of these instruments. It is shown that
the Tax/Subsidy instrument is less eﬀective after the group has some experience under the
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Group Fine instrument which typically converged to the non-cooperative equilibrium where
individuals choose their unconstrained level of emission. This suggests that implementing a
Tax/Subsidy instrument in an environment where the polluters are accustomed to not con-
trolling their emissions may be problematic. The primary area of concern, however, is that
the Tax/Subsidy instrument is less able to induce individuals to choose the target outcome
with heterogeneous agents. This problem is tied to the observation that small capacity subjects
reduce their emissions by less than the optimal amount and large capacity subjects reduce their
emissions by more than the optimal amount. Once the small capacity subjects have realized
that the large capacity subjects will reduce their emission levels by more, they can force the
large capacity subjects to accept more of the burden of the emissions reduction by keeping their
emissions high.
However, If we were only concerned with the aggregate level of emission, then a Tax/Subsidy
instrument of the form suggested in Segerson [22] can induce individuals to reduce their emis-
sion levels, thus mitigating the problem of moral hazard in groups. This suggests that these
instruments may be able to induce nonpoint source polluters to reduce their emissions. Indeed
the reductions found in the laboratory environment were of the order of sixty-nine percent
reducing emissions to within twenty-ﬁve percent of the target level.16
This study highlights the importance of allowing ﬁrms to be exempt from the emissions
tax if they can credibly show that they are reducing their emissions appropriately [32]. This
would eliminate the ability of some agents to force other agents to reduce their emissions below
the optimal level in order to avoid the emissions tax. In future work I intend to investigate
an environment with both an ambient pollution instrument and a self-reporting instrument.
Moreover, further investigation is required to see whether this behavior (smaller subjects not
reducing their emissions by enough and larger subjects reducing by too much) is consistent with
diﬀerent hypotheses on individual preferences or with a decision error model as suggested by
Palfrey and Prisbrey [18] and Anderson, et al. [1].
16 These percentages are calculated using the mean group emission level for the Tax/Subsidy instrument from
Table IV.
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SP Joint beneﬁt function, Social Planner’s Problem
n indexes individuals 1 to 6
xn individual n’s emission level
Bn(xn) individual n’s private beneﬁt function
X sum of all individual’s emission levels
D(X) damage costs from aggregate individual emissions
xmax
n individual n’s unconstrained emission level
Tn(X) ambient pollution Instrument
sn proportional subsidy
tn proportional tax
βn lump sum subsidy
τn lump sum tax
X∗ exogenous target
πn individual n’s payoﬀ function
Prob() probability
X−n the sum of all individuals’ emission levels except subject n
p the proportion of subjects
 eﬃciency
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Figure 2:   Mean Group Totals by Period for the Group Fine Instrument with 
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Figure 4:   Mean Group Totals by Period for the Group Fine Instrument with 
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Figure 5:   Efficiency: Order Effects, Homogeneity versus Heterogeneity 
 
 
Figure 6:   Distributions of Individual Decisions, Large Capacity Subjects, Periods 
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Figure 7:   Distributions of Individual Decisions, Small Capacity Subjects, Periods 
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